CBMTS Industry V

Congress Summaries

    

CBMTS Industry V
"The Fourth World Congress on Chemical, Biological and Radiological Terrorism"

Cavtat – Dubrovnik, 14 – 20 April 2007

Congress Chair: Dr. Slavko Bokan (Croatia)
Congress Co-Crair: Barbara Price (US)

Sector I - Chemical and Radiological Threats
Chair: Dr. David Moore
Co-Chair: Dr. R.C. Whitcomb Jr.
Co-Chair: Dr. Ronald Chesser

Thirteen oral presentations by scientists from nine counties provided the content of the Chemical and Radiological Threats Sector of CBMTS Industry V. The presentations covered a broad range of topics in three major categories:

  1. Medical aspects of toxic chemicals,
  2. Detection and health effects of radiation and
  3. Policy issues related to the control of hazardous materials.
The following is a list of final presentations.

Session 4
Chair: Dr. Mahdi Balali-Mood
Co-Chair: Dr. Mason Soule

Presentations

  1. 1. Protein Changes in Sulfur Mustard Exposure: Diagnostic and Therapeutic Implications, Prabhati Ray
  2. Cell Death Mechanisms in Sulfur Mustard Injury: Basis for Therapeutics Development, Radharaman Ray
  3. New Directions in Antidote Treatment of OP Intoxications, Christophor Dishovsky
  4. Radiological Dispersal, Polonium-210, and Lessons for Public Health, Robert Whitcomb
  5. Border Control of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Materials, Sasa Medakovic

Session 9 - Chair: Dr. Christophor Dishovsky
Co-Chair: Dr. Tim Bauer

Presentations

  1. Pakistan’s Approach Towards Chem-Bio Issues, Muhammad Javaid Iqbal
  3. Role of Chemical Weapons Convention in Combating Chemical Terrorism, Jiri Matousek
  4. Toxic Effects of Peracetic Acid Used as a Chemical Weapon During Worker Riots, Jasmina Jovic-Stosic

Session 13
Chair: Dr. Murray Hamilton
Co-Chair: LT. Bryon Marsh

Presentations

  1. The Importance of Particle Size in Estimating Downwind Contamination from an RDD, Timothy Bauer
  2. Contemporary Pollution Due to Old Uranium Tails, Igor Hadjamberdiev
  3. Diagnostic and Therapeutic Dilemmas in Acute OP Poisoning and New Potential Therapeutic Agents
  4. Identification of Opium and Heroin Body Packing in Medical Imaging in the Poisoned and Non-Poisoned Drug Smuggler

Sulphur Mustard has been employed against military and civilians targets, however specific antidotes, preventatives and treatments remain elusive. Two presentations offered insight into the mechanism of sulphur mustard injury and proposed rational approaches for new drug development. Pathways to SM-induced skin injury such as inflammation and protease stimulation were proposed. Experiments conducted on human epidermal keritinocytes exposed to SM demonstrated the role laminin-5 degradation in the disruption of attachment proteins in the skin. The degradation of laminin-5 can also serve as a rapid and specific biomarker of SM injury. The mechanism of cell death (apoptosis) caused by SM can follow a number of biochemical pathways depending on the type of cell effected, skin, bronchial epithelium or alveolar epithelium. The data presented showed that SM-induced activation of caspase is the major pathway to apoptosis and drugs can be identified that inhibit the activation of this pathway.

In regards to nerve agents, results of pharmacokinetic and efficacy studies of a number of oximes were presented. Special emphasis was made of several pyridinium oximes with hetero-cyclic ring structures. The efficacy of these complex oximes against nerve agent challenges in animals was similar to that of basic oximes, however, their improved safety profiles and bioavailability may make them candidates for future consideration.

The use of oximes against OP intoxication is only one aspect of a multi-drug protocol needed to provide optimum medical support in a hospital setting. In fact the use of oximes may not always add value to therapy and there are dilemmas with each of the standard therapies that must be addressed with each patient.

Forensic analysis of nerve agent exposure in human clinical samples is important for bio-monitoring. Novel methods using solid phase micro-extraction coupled to GCMS for detection of nerve agent metabolites and nerve agent adducts in urine and plasma were described. One of the methods uses reactivation of the nerve agent from adducts prior to detection.

In a clinical report, a case study of a cohort of healthy young men intentionally exposed to high concentrations of peracetic acid vapour and liquid was detailed. The exposures, the resulting injuries, their progression and the ultimate resolution were meticulously documented. The report represent a unique situation but demonstrates that a chemical often used as a disinfectant can, under certain conditions, be used as a weapon.

Turning to radiation; In a recent case of intentional poisoning with Polonium-210 the death of the intended target initiated a comprehensive epidemiological study. The spread of Polonium-210 was determined by monitoring urine excretion of the toxicant in persons who could have been inadvertently exposed. Of particular note was the finding that universal hospital precautions minimized exposure to hospital workers.

Modelling of the downwind hazard of a radiological dispersal device was accomplished by using various available radioisotopes. The carrier states of the material determined the particle size and thus the dispersal efficacy, environmental hazard and health effects of the radiation. Critical information regarding the impact of a terrorist use of a dirty bomb can be gained from these models.

Detection of nuclear and radiological materials to prevent transhipment of restricted materials has been implemented at the borders of Croatia. This new capability is not without important technical challenges however. False positive signals from materials such as ceramics complicate the process. We were also made aware of diagnostic procedures to detect unique ways of smuggle restricted materials within human body cavities.

Radio-ecological disasters caused by decades of nuclear weapons production have not been fully identified, let alone remediated, and there is evidence of potential catastrophic pollution from uranium mining in Kyrgyzstan.

The Chemical Weapons Convention and other treaties and national policies aimed at preventing proliferation of dangerous materials were the topics of two presentations. From a national perspective, Pakistan’s accomplishments in the implementation of non-proliferation policies suggest that diligence by the national authority is critical. On an international level, information was presented that emphasised the importance of the Chemical Weapons Convention in mitigating the use of toxic chemicals as tools for terrorist use.

I would like to thank the presenters, session chairs and co-chairs as well as the sector co-chairs for their contributions to this productive and stimulating meeting. Additionally, I thank the all participants for their interest in the subjects covered in this sector.

Sector II
Biological and Terrorism Threats and Opening Overview

Sessions 1, 2, and 6
Chair: Dr. David Robinson
Co-chair: Dr. Venkat Rao

Sector 2 contained three sessions with a total of 14 presentations. These spanned the spectrum from the establishment of the legal and political foundations to guide an appropriate, integrated response to the threat of terrorism to medical solutions intended to address some of the many problems connected with countering or mitigating the effects of biological or chemical attacks or epidemics of emerging infectious diseases.

Session 1: CBMTS-Industry V, CBMTS General Overview

Chair: Dr. Slavko Bokan (Croatia)
Co-chair: Dr. Barbara Price (US)

In the opening presentation Dr. Baud (France) provided evidence collected over the last 57 years proving that no clinical sign, or collection of signs, were pathognomonic for cyanide intoxication. Rather the identification of the condition relied on the consideration of a number of signs, which increased the opportunity for missed diagnoses. This, in turn, provides the impetus for the development of a treatment that could be administered to suspected cases with little danger of toxic effects on the recipient.

Dr. David Robinson (US) presented the analytical process that Battelle developed to ensure that the facility that it was planning met the US government’s rules and regulations as they relate to the biosafety and biosecurity of Select Agent work in high containment laboratories. The process first assigned a Risk Group (RG) to the microorganism and the work being done with the organism. This RG was used to identify a Biological Safety Level (BSL) as defined in the Biosafety in Medical and Biological Laboratories published by the US Centers for Disease Control and the National Institutes of Health. Personnel training and refresher training and community relations were stressed as absolutely crucial aspects of operating a high containment laboratory.

Dr. Gareva (Macedonia) presented a new aspect of terrorism to the CBMTS members present. She pointed out that we had all had experience in dealing with computer viruses which are a subset of the larger group of cyber-terrorist attacks. The relative ease and anonymity of cyber-terrorism makes it an appealing crime for terrorists and pranksters. Since the result of the attack can spread so rapidly over the world the combating of cyber-terrorism demands an international response. As with any threat, this requires the strategic management of the threats, risks, and vulnerabilities.

Dr. Chesser (US) provided information related to the development of models for the radionuclide release following the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear facility. The mathematical models developed were in excellent agreement with the data from 3,000 data points collected up to 7 miles from the facility. More concentrated sampling from the villages near the facility showed that looting of yellow cake had occurred and was the major cause of the dispersion of the radioactivity.

Session 2: Biological Threat/Terrorism 1

Chair: Dr. Venkat Rao (US)
Co-chair: Dr. Sasa Medakovic (Croatia)

Dr. Ryabchikova (Russian Federation) reviewed the literature on the gross and microscopic pathology of the H5N1 strain of influenza virus in susceptible species and related this published information to her work at VECTOR. The H5N1 strain does not appear to vary significantly from other strains of influenza meeting the criteria for HPAI strains with the exception that it is much more virulent for fowl and spreads more readily from bird to bird than most of the other identified HPAI strains. This is thought to be a result of the distribution of proteases in birds, and their ability to cleave the proteins produced by the virus. The hemagglutin (H) attaches to cell receptors and allows the virus to enter the cell, while the neuraminidase (N) is necessary for the virus to be released from the cell. Cellular enzymes facilitate these processes, and these enzymes are more widely distributed in birds than in mammals.

Dr. Taleski (Macedonia) stressed the important role to be played by military and military medical assets in the event of a pandemic of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) specifically the H5N1 strain. Involvement of the military would provide two major benefits to the civil healthcare system. First the military support would ease the burden on the civilian system of caring for the influx of patients. This would allow the civilian hospitals to continue providing emergency care as necessary for cases unrelated to the pandemic. Second, the early involvement of military assets would minimize the risk of the spread of the virus to unaffected populations. Such prompt and seamless cooperation will require preexisting documents detailing all aspects of the cooperation.

Dr. Van Kampen (US) described the development of an adenovirus 5 (Ad5) vectored highly pathogenic avian influenza vaccine (HPAI). This Ad5 vectored vaccine has several advantages over the current, licensed egg based vaccine. The Ad5 vaccine is a “cleaner” vaccine since it can be grown in cell culture rather than whole embryonate eggs, it can be administered by the intranasal route, it does not require adjuvants to produce an immune response, and immunity is seen following a single dose. In addition, the immunity following vaccination in chickens can be differentiated from the immune response following recovery from the disease. Thus infected flocks can be identified and destroyed to prevent the spread of the disease.

Dr. Leitner (US) presented information on a major policy weakness related to the response to a major, biological crisis. The current planning assumes that critical personnel and first responders will report for work in the event of a biological attack. In fact, interviews with personnel indicate that many will provide help to their families prior to reporting to work. In the chaotic situation following the recognition of a biological attack many personnel might not report for work for days or weeks following the emergency. A systematic study of the motivating factors and behavior of these personnel could provide an opportunity to build features into the emergency plans that would provide assurances that their personal concerns are understood, given value and resolved in an acceptable manner.

Session 6: Biological Threats/Terrorism 2

Chair: Prof. Elena Ryabchikova
Co-chair: Dr. Vaso Taleski

Dr. Van Kampen (US) reported on a novel non-replicating Adenovirus-vectored anthrax vaccine. The vaccine was developed by molecular biology methods and targeted at the anthrax protective antigen. Studies in the mouse experimental model provided proof of the high protection efficacy of the vaccine. This vaccine represents a new generation of anthrax vaccines with an excellent safety profile for the recipients and the environment. In addition, its nasal administration makes it adaptable for mass vaccination by trained, non-medical personnel in the event of an emergency.

Prof. Matousek (Czech Republic) presented the Czech National Action Plan for combating terrorism. The conception and details of the Plan were presented showing the necessity for a complex approach, and the requirement for broad institutional cooperation in the development of countermeasures against Biological Threats. The Czech National Action Plan is updated annually, and is a political document which identifies the threats and contains agreed, harmonized, and active measures to be undertaken by involved organizations in the case of a terrorist attack. The presented data may be useful for other countries developing similar documents.

Mr. Stipetic (Croatia) presented intelligence and security standards for the protection of industrial facilities in the case of terrorism or military attack. The attention was paid to industrial facilities using toxic chemicals in their production cycle. While there are few international legal regulations covering such an attack, the purposeful attack of industrial facilities could result in catastrophic consequences. The safety of chemical industry facilities requires the incorporation of aspects of safety in the public culture of all the involved. Problems of public safety and security in the face of various terrorist actions were discussed.

Dr. Savov (Bulgaria) presented data about the multi-drug resistant Acinetobacter spp. Strains being isolated in Bulgaria. The species is one of the most common pathogens causing infections following hospitalization. The study revealed an increase in the last three years of the percentage of A. baumannii strains showing resistance to multiple antibiotics, including the latest generation of cephalosporins, quinolones, and carbapenems. The study stressed a necessity of studies to define the antibiotic resistance mechanisms in A. baumannii.

Dr. Kenar (Turkey) reported on the approach of Turkey to bioterrorism incidents. Features specific for biological terrorism and the management of its consequences were noted. The necessity for the involvement of a number of different organizations in the response to a bioterrorism attack at sequential levels was discussed. A scenario simulating a bioterrorist attack and describing the response and coordination developed was schematically presented and discussed

Dr. Rao (US) presented a biohazard analysis for two candidate vaccine strains – Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis virus strain 3526, and Francisella tularensis strain LVS. Data for the biohazard assessment of these two vaccines were presented including a review of the published works devoted to medical pathology, epidemiology, and preclinical testing. A weight-of-evidence scoring system was used in a systematic analytical framework to perform a risk assessment. This assessment indicated that the above strains were suitable for manufacturing and a follow-on Phase 1 clinical trial.

The eclectic collection of papers presented in Sector 2 is a reflection of the breadth of the CNB threats facing the world today, and the difficulties of preparing to respond in an appropriate fashion to mitigate the effects of the attack or incident and shorten the period of time for reestablishment of the normal, social infrastructure.

Sector III
Consequence Management/Medical

Chair: Steve Bice (US)
Co-Chair: Dr. David Stockwell (US)
Co-Chair: Dr. Pavel Castulik (Czech Republic)

Session 3
Chair: Dr. David Stockwell (US)
Co.Chair: Dr. Anja Cizmek (Croatia)

Four presenters discussed a variety of topics including:

  1. Dr. Balali-Mood presented on the very positive effects of inexpensive and readily available antidotes to organophosphorous poisoning—the link between availability and cost is important and must be factored into any/all formularies worldwide;
  2. Dr. Baud presented on the relationship between smoke inhalation and cyanide poisoning—this presentation is linked to Drs Hall and Borron in the second Consequence Management session (please see below);
  3. Mr. Bice presented on international response to disasters; and,
  4. Dr. Castulik analyzed the role of emergency medical service in all chemical/biological /radiological incidents.

Session 7
Chair: General/Dr. Florin Paul (Romania)
Co-Chair: Dr. Michael Taylor (US)

Four presenters discussed three scientific topics and one discussed response mechanisms developed in the US.

  1. Dr. Hall discussed the implications surrounding the newly US FDA approved antidote to cyanide, hydroxocobalamin;
  2. Dr Borron, discussed an all-hazards approach to cyanide poisoning—both Drs Hall and Borron also demonstrated the value of international cooperation in research and development as the work done in France on hydroxocobalamin recently resulted in approval of this antidote by the US FDA;
  3. Dr Hamilton presented on drug discovery pathways with implications both for research and development in industry/commercial and governmental agencies which deal with drug discovery; and,
  4. Mr. Adams discussed two counter-measure programs designed and implemented by the US Strategic National Stockpile: the Chemical Pack program which forward position chemical antidotes in state and local areas and the establishment of Federal Medical Stations to augment emergency hospital beds during a disaster.

Session 12
Chair: Dr. Stef Stienstra (Netherlands)
Co-Chair: Ms Elizabeth Poythress (US)

Five presentations in total; three papers on medical treatment and/or medical outcome and one on preparedness and one on an information gathering/analytical system.

  1. Dr. Jacevic discussed the efficacy of new combination treatment of T-2 toxin poisoning (an overview of the evaluation of the antidotal potential of the nonsteroidal anti-inflamatory drug nimesulide and zeolite absorbent on trichothene mycotoxin. T-2 toxin—a natural metabolite which potentially could be used as a weapon of mass destruction and the proposed therapy shows efficacy in an animal model (rats);
  2. Dr. Taylor presented a system for capturing toxological information in an environmental release of a CBRN material—this data system for all kinds of information for the rapid assessment of risks posed by the release of CBRN materials in the environment;
  3. General Dr. Paul discussed hospital preparedness for CB attack—a clear overview of all aspects and challenges which have to be taken to prepare a hospital to respond to a biological or chemical attack;
  4. Dr. Khateri was not able to attend the conference, and was replaced by Dr. Vladimir Rembovskiy discussed the sanitary assessment of hazardous materials exposed to highly toxic chemical compounds;
  5. Dr. Borron presented on intraosseous administration of antidotes when treating victims exposed to chemicals—this alternative to intravenous infusion of therapeutic agents showed how remarkably fast the therapies will spread from the bone marrow to the entire body with the use of commercially available equipment.

Common issues with the 3 Sessions:

  1. The presentations concentrated on applied science and not on research, per se.
  2. When discussing outcomes of scientific research each presenter concentrated their discussions on medical management of victims
  3. When discussing non-medical countermeasures, each presenter concentrated on response and consequence management to real-world disasters and emergencies.

The future of the consequence management sector:

  1. It might be interesting to invite more manufacturers to present…if they have an exhibition or a table, perhaps they could give a 3 minute outline of their offerings/product lines in the session reserved for Sponsors/Commercial guests.
  2. I personally would like to see fire, police and emergency managers from around the world, including the US, invited and participating in the Congress. I realize space is limited, but perhaps one fire department, one police and one emergency medical component—clearly not all from the same nation?
  3. Respectfully suggest a policy person present at each Congress on a topic that will be stimulating, perhaps even controversial: are we prepared as a world community? Is WHO prepared to take on the next SARS? Does the all-hazards approach to planning and response really help us prepare for Pan Flu?

Sector IV
Sector IV comprised the themes Detection, Identification and Decontamination at the CBMTS-Industry and covered Session 5 with the same themes and the poster session, which covered of course far more subjects.

Session 5 (Detection, Identification and Decontamination) of the CBMTS-Industry was held on Tuesday 17 April 2007 from 10:30 to 12:30. The original session Chair, Dr. Rashid Khadarov (Uzbekistan), was unable to attend and was replaced by 1LT Bryon Marsh (USA) with Nayla Feghali (Canada) as acting Co-Chairs. Six papers were scheduled for presentation but only five were presented. Michal Bartoszcze (Poland) was not able to come to Dubrovnik to present his paper with title: Biological Threats Detection Technologies.

The presentation topics covered during the session were varied and represented contributions from The Netherlands, Russian Federation, Serbia, and the USA. The perspectives also varied from detection capability and policy development by David Trudil and Stef Stienstra to the application of novel procedures and methods as presented by Bryon Marsh and Elena Savel’eva. Respiratory protection concerns with regards to nanoparticles and leakage were presented by Milena Jovasevic-Stojanovic.

Milena Jovasecic-Stojanovic (Serbia) presented the efficiency of personal protective equipment to nanosized CBR paricles and illustrated this with experimental data.

Bryon Marsh (USA) discussed a demonstration exercise of a validation sample collection method for powders suspected of being biological agents, which was held last years in Georgia with a nice clarifying video.

Elena Savel’eva (Russian Federation) gave a very informative lecture on the development of procedures developed in St Petersburg for the analysis of components of dumped chemical weapons and their principal transformation and degradation products in sea water.

Stef Stienstra (The Netherlands) gave an overview of the requirements for the analytic procedures needed to search, detect and identify potential dangerous chemicals and biologicals in the environment. He gave a few examples of technologies for both screening and analytic procedures to detect biological threats.

David Trudil showed how near infra-red, luminescence and other rapid methods. The technical developments are not as fast as we would like and he presented some pit falls, but also promising opportunities.

All posters were included in sector IV. These were a great diversity of subjects. Walter Katzung presented an overview of the scientific support by commercial available gray area literature for terrorists. It is unbelievable what is available in the public domain.

Eric Stephen showed the NaVirCept, an innovative Anti-viral project.

Vladimir Superina (Croatia) made us aware that liquid missile fuels have a potential to be misused. Kawa Dizaye (Iraq) showed the morbidity and mortality of the population in Kurdistan. In northern Iraq chemical weapons were used against the local Kurdish population. He presented a study of 300 households, which detailed an increase in cancer, miscarriages and various other diseases.

Stephen Borron (USA) presented the ‘Advanced Hazmat Life Support’ course. He presented that the knowledge of physicians, nurses and EMT’s in the medical management of hazardous materials victims is seriously lacking. The AHLS provides a course with a focus on training healthcare professionals in the medical management of patients rather than incidents as well as how to deal with the medical consequences.

Slavko Bokan gave on his poster an overview of the laws and regulations for control of potential C- and/or B- weaponizable products.

Sevet Mecinovic (Macedonia) presented the experience of Macedonia in its WMD non-proliferation policy. We learned that in 1997 Macedonia accepted the CWC convention, than proceeded to change its criminal laws and plans to petition for OPCW membership in 2008/2009.

We learned more about the military medical academy in Belgrade, Serbia. It is a tertiary level institution with a reserve of 10 – 15% unoccupied beds kept for emergency admissions. It has a full team of 39 doctors to respond to an event. It has a mobile toxicological unit and can be deployed by ground or air to help detect, identify and quantify an accident, provide first aid and to organize treatment just to name a few of its capabilities.

And of course I have to mention the poster of Barbara Price to draw attention on the Journal of Medical Chemical, Biological and Radiological Defense. This publication is a peer reviewed journal of original scientific research and clinical and doctrinal knowledge in the area of medical, chemical, biological and radiological defense. It is a free journal available on the Internet.

Sector V
Dual Use: Biosafety and Biosecurity, Commercial

Sector V was chaired by Eric Stephen and co-chaired by Dr. Stepen Borron and Ms. Nayla Feghali. The Sector contributed 15 papers, over three Sessions.

Session 8: Dual-Use Biosafety and Biosecurity 1

The Session was chaired by Dr. Jacques Lavigne and co-chaired by Dr. Barbara Priceand consisted of 6 speakers. The first three speakers provided the link between dual use and biosafety and biosecurity. The final three speakers detailed what their countries are doing with respect to dual use, biosecurity and biosafety.

The first paper, presented by Eliza Harris, set the stage for the discussion and detailed the major initiatives currently underway in the United States. These included work by the National Academy of Sciences (Fink Report), the Bush Biosafety Initiative (National Science Advisory Board for Biotechnology) and spoke of the proliferation of biodefense reasearch and the work that her group had undertaken at the University of Maryland. A three tier oversight paradigm was presented for potentially dangerous activities, moderately dangerous activities (i.e. involves pathogens already identified as public health threats) and extremely dangerous activities. Oversight would be at the local, national and international levels, respectively.

A licensing system to ensure, that scientists working with special highly pathogenic agents was advocated to provide assurance of the qualifications and reliability of those working in the domai. It was suggested that the primary risks are more likely to be linked to an inadvertent spread of agent and not an intentional use. Finally, based on empirical evidence, the argument was made that this sytem would minimally impact the science community. The study looked at R&D on agents and activities over a five year period and found that less than 1% of literature between 1999 and 2003 would have been affect by the proposed biosecurity guidelines.

The next presentor, Jack Radisch, built upon the earlier presentation and provided an overview on what the OECD is doing in the field of biosecurity. The rapid movement to the globalization of biotechnology research and partnerships was highlighted and the argument presented for a sustained international approach. He pointed to US guidelines that are technology driven (recombinant) limited in terms of scope (NIH funding), with no force of law. The OECDs work on Biological Research Centres (BRCs), to ensure or at least assure the safety & security of culture collections and not impede freedom to operate was presented.

The third speaker, Dr. Carleton Phillips, brought a non-proliferation view to the table and linked it to the issue of biosecurity. Points of interest included the conclusion that very seldom are issues truly local or national for very long, in fact they are likely to become intenational very quickly. As with the first presentation there was specific reference to the risks associated with inadvertance and a lack of long term thought on implications of a given research effort in the planning stages.

The last three papers presented in Session 8, dealt with national initiatives in Russia, Canada and Georgia.

In the first paper by Dr. Elena Rhiabchikova, reference was made to challenges presented in terms of biosecurity through the dual use nature of many materials. In addition, reference was made to the need for a culture of awareness that should be incalcated into the laboratory culture and training. The importance of strong international cooperation was highlighted. Access to information via the internet (H5N1, SARS sequences) that can be used for both beneficial and malevolent ends. Finally, the need for international efforts in providing essential materials to address biosafety and secureity concerns was highlight and an example of a cooperative effort between Canada and Russia regarding the translation of the Canadian Laboratory Safety Guidelines into Russian. Russia has had a number of meetings in the last two years to develop and coordinate efforts in biosecurity and biosafety

Maureen Ellis, the second speaker presented an overview of the biosecurity and biosafety program and its place within the Global Partnership Program (GPP). The GPP is a G-8 initiative arising from the 2002 Summit in Kananaskis, Canada. The GPP is a non-proliferation program. The biological non-proliferation program portion of the Canadian GPP concentrates on:

  1. guidelines and standards
  2. training disease diagnostics, transportation of pathogenic facilities
  3. training centers
  4. biosafety associations
  5. upgrades for laboratories and facilities

Canada's priorities within the GPP are Russia and countries of the Former Soviet Union. There are plans for extending this scope into central Asia. The point was made that biosecurity and biosafety should be a part of how we do science. We need to be practical about how of biosafety and biosecurity are integrated into the dual use dialog. Additionally the need for a whole systems approach was pointed to as was the importance of partnering in an international sense.

The final presentation of Sesssion 8, provided by Dr. Mzia Katateladze, highlighted the strengthening of biosecurity and biosafety strengthening programs in Georgia. The lack of effort in these areas is legacy issues from the Soviet era. Republic of Georgia is implementing measures to meet US biosafety and security standards, and the country is working with the US towards the elimination of BW infrastructure and technologies. This new BWP Program concentrates on enhancing threat agent detection and response, dismantlement and elimination of bio-threat agent materials, promotion of a culture of openness and ethical conduct coupled with the training of scientists in safe, modern, techniques. There is work underway to develop a central reference laboratory.

Session 10: Sponsors/Commercial

Session 10 was chaired by Dr. Alan Hall and co-chaired by Ms Karen Rymarzik. Four papers were presented in this session.

The first paper, by Ms. Nayla Feghali, addressed Reactive Skin Decontamination Lotion (RSDL). This was a brief overview of recent and planned developments of RSDL now that the license to produce (GMP facility), sell, and distribute the product has been acquired by EZ-EM. Of note is that RSDL is solvent (glycol)-based. Two contrasting case reports were presented on patients exposed to sulfur mustard during the Canadian Swiftsure chemical agent destruction program. One patient was treated with usual burn care and required 4 weeks for healing. The other was decontaminated with RSDL on the 2nd day after exposure and had subsequent RSDL applied to assist debridement of blisters; healing of primary lesions was in 1 week and secondary lesions in 2 weeks. RSDL has been approved for US military-wide acquisition in March 2006.

The second paper, by Dr. Gareth Roberts, dealt with the integration of a small Thermal Desorption system (TD) system for air monitoring into a mobile analytical laboratory in France used by the NRBC emergency first responder police organization. This technology was integrated into a compact mobile laboratory vehicle operated by the French Gendarmerie National which can analyze air, liquid, and solid samples. A headspace technique allows large sample sizes. TD is a sampling technique utilized heating and then a cold trap which does not require a cryogen and can detect agents at the ppb or lower levels, allowing up to a 106 concentration factor. Samples can be quantitatively re-collected for re-analysis.

The third presentation, also by Dr. Roberts, described a continuous dual-track monitoring system utilizing 2 tracks of the Thermal Desorption technology introduced in the second paper. Because on track can be in sampling mode while the other is in analytical mode, there are no “blind spots” as found during the analysis mode in a single-track system. These dual-track cold traps do not require a cryogen. The system allows near real time (NRT) monitoring and has a good correlation between manual liquid agent injection and air monitoring.

The final paper dealt with the CBNS Technology Program and Mobile CBRN Detection System. This presentation described portable and fixed CBRN detectors and a collaborative program between Environics and the Finnish Defense Force to develop them. The devices can detect CW agents, TICs Toxins, BW agents, and gamma, alpha, beta, and neutron radiation. There is a bioaersol detector which measures particle size by UV fluoroscopy with a low percentage of false positive values. A combined CBRN detector was utilized to safeguard the 2006 NATO summit in Riga.

Session 16: Dual Use, Biosafety and and Biosecurity 2

This session was chaired by Dr. Carleton Phillips and co-chaired by Ms. Maureen Ellis and consisted of six presentations that approached dual use from a number of perspectives. The first paper, presented by Damir Trut, addressed the more classic definition of dual use with respect to export and import controls on dual use or dual purpose items and provided an overview of the Croatian experience with EU legislation along with an analysis of Croatian legislation. The information and education program on dual use was highlighted. One significant issue raised was the inconsistent and vague wording that impacted implementation of the EU policies and legislation with respect to WMD nonproliferation.

The second paper, presented by Dr. Vencat Rao, described the analytical tools used in facility biosafety and biosecurity assessments of industrial and bioprocessing facilities as well as repositories for specimens applied to the biodefence vaccine delelopment program. Maximum Credible Event analysis provides an estimate, based on existing procedures and facility design attributes, of the probability of release. The approach discussed issues such as facility vulnerability and soft issues related to employment procedures, background checks amongst others.

Dr. Slavko Bokan presented the third paper in the session. His presentation came at the dual use issue from the standpoint of codes of conduct. Codes are a formal statement of values and practices that are intended to reduce the risk of that scientific research will be misued. It was pointed out that at the last BTWC Meeting of States Experts, Codes of Conduct were discussed. This points toward a growing awareness of the topic and a realization, that there is much still to be completed. The theme of universalization was again picked up on. Development of codes of conduct was seen as a step towards the safe, secure and ethical conduct of research in the life sciences, including NBC defence research.

The fourth paper, presented by Eric Stephen, detailed the development of a Theat Assessment Framework that is intended as a first step towards the advancement of a comprehensive tool to help quantify the dual use threat. The framework was presented as a matrix, arraying dual use process elements against a set of assessment components. One of the key points made was that the concept of a threat assessment tool or aid is overdue. Additionally it was pointed out that such an assessment tool or aid and had utility on a more global level to (1) establish common terminology and models, (2) set the agenda of concern and (3) define common responses and enable a more common and collaborative approach.

The final paper provided by Dr. Murray Hamilton, provided yet another example of inadvertance and pointed towards an oversight mechanism being employed in Canada, the BCDRC that might serve as a model for consideration by those charged with assessing risk associated with dual use.

Summary

Overall a number of themes emerged

  1. The dual use threat is real and the impacts of dual use research oughtnot be minimized.
  2. There is recognition that the dual use is an issue that is international in scope and needs to be addressed by the international science community, especially in light of the ever expanding numbers of facilities, scientists and industries working in areas supporting biodefence.
  3. Biosafety and biosecurity go hand in hand and are inextricably linked with dual use.
  4. There is a need for a harmonization of terminology.
  5. Oversight will be difficult, and there are significant sensitivities among the various communities
  6. There is perhaps a need to be judicious with respect to oversight, concentrating on the significant risks

The solution space is developing but still needs to be defined and looked at with more granularity although multiple national efforts and the efforts being pursued under internationally under the aegis, for example, of the BTWC.

Sector VI
The Congress Technical Demonstration and Related Exhibition (TD)

Chair: MS Damir Trut (Croatia)
Co-Chair: Alenko Ribic (Croatia)
Co-Chair: Major Tomica Sabolic (Croatia)
Co-Chair: Major Darrin Smith (US)
Co-Chair: Goran Violic (Croatia)
Moderator: Jefry Allen (US)

Main survey of the demonstration and guidelines developed by Goran Violić, head of the Regional office for protection and rescue Dubrovnik, National Protection and rescue Directorate.

Forces and recources included in the demonstration are:

Croatian Ministry of Interior:

  1. Special police squad,
  2. Airport border police

Airport Dubrovnik:

  1. Airport security service
  2. Fire Brigade unit
  3. Management and personnel of the airport

National Protection and Rescue Directorate:

  1. Regional Office for Protection and Rescue Dubrovnik
  2. Fire brigade unit of the Dubrovnik-Neretva county
  3. Other operation forces of protection and rescue

Croatian Ministry of Defence:

  1. Special unit ABKO
  2. Aircraft AN-22 with crew

USA, Georgia, HAZ-MAT Civil Support Team

Chronological report of the airport demonstration:

First, after an urgent notification from a state partner that an aircraft which is heading to the Airport Dubrovnik carrying terrorists and pathogen biological material, the authorities of the Republic of Croatia developed an operation plan in cooperation with experts from state partners and the security protection forces of the airport and pronounced the state of alert.

After the landing, the plane was directed on a side way and was surrounded by strong security forces of the airport border police. In very short time, all teams arrived at the airport, prepared and ready for action:

  1. a negotiation team,
  2. MUP special police squad,
  3. squad and teams of the National Protection and Rescue Directorate),
  4. fire fighting team,
  5. medical teams,
  6. toxicological experts,
  7. the Special Armed Forces unit ABKO and
  8. HAZ-MAT Team.

The terrorists was called to surrender - they responded by throwing out female pasesenger through the plane door. The Croatian government with the consent of the state where most of the passengers are from authorises the attack and aircraft take-over with use of lethal fire on identified terrorists.

In the mean time, National Protection and Rescue Directorate conducted a preventive evacuation of the population, in the wind direction and 10 km into inland and in the widht ranging from 1 km to 5 km.

MUP special police squad gets into the aircraft and took control in the cabin. All passengers and members of the crew were evacuated from the plane without their personal things.

After evacuation, HAZ-MAT Support team and scouts of the special armed forces unit ABKO entered and searched the carbine and language space for biological terrorists agent - such language was taking out of the plane to be decontaminated with biological decontamination foam and after that was carried out into a special hermetically closed room. The rest of the language was carried out by members of the airport fire department, and was also treated with the decontamination foam and stored in the special room.

All thing and packages that were suspected to have some kind of a mechanism which could, if opened cause the biological material to disseminated in the surrounding, were destroyed without opening, in the Blast-Guard antiterrorist tent.

At the same time triage and decontamination of the personnel, passengers and terrorist was being conducted as well as medical, psychological and logistic care, further on an investigation took place in order to disclose all terrorists.

After all things and goods have been carried out from the aircraft, the biological decontamination of the aircraft and environment was conducted.

Institute for the public health and ABKO unit started public monitoring until the laboratory confirmed that no decontamination has taken place.

The monitoring lasts until decontamination of the whole contaminated area has been carried out.

The duration of this successful demonstration was 1 hour exactly as planned.

After the demonstration, observers could approach to the exhibited equipment like tents, vehicles and other equipment and make questions to the teams.

The demonstration approved that particular scenario or some others (similar to this one) can be reality.

We could see all complexibility of almost real situation and multidisciplinary-that is successful engagement of numerous methods, forces and equipment needed for solving those situations. Republic of Croatia approved that its preparedness for any kind of CBR threats that could possible appear is on a high level.

This demonstration also showed and approved that existence of leading national organization for protection and rescue, which has a crucial role in managing, leading and also in making decisions, is necessary and very important.

Croatian forces, which purpose is to face and solve consequences of a terrorist CBR threats or attacks, are very well trained and equipped.

Also, it approved well operability and compatibility with existing teams from NATO state members.