Congress Overview
The CBMTS-Industry II " The First Congress on Chemical and Biological Terrorism"
Dubrovnik, Croatia, 20 – 27 April 2001.
Congress Chair: Dr. Slavko Bokan M.D. (Croatia)
Congress Co-Chair: Dr. Barbara Price (USA)
Congress Overview and Summary
World Congress on Chemical and Biological Terrorism: Pre-Congerss Workshop presented by Dr. David Moore
Sector Information compiled and edited by Sector Chair, Dr. David Moore, Battelle Memorial Institute and Sector Co-Chair, Dr. Brian Davy, OPCW.
The following report by Dr. David Moore covers the Pre-Congress Workshop, 20/21 April, which was, very much appreciated by the CBMTS members. This Workshop archetype will be incorporated into future CBMTS meetings. The CBMTS-Industry II World Congress on Chemical and Biological Terrorism Pre-Congress Workshop presented by Dr. David Moore Sector information compiled and edited by Dr. David Moore, Battelle Memorial Institute, Sector Chair and Dr. Brian Davy, OPCW, Sector Co-Chair.
Session 1: A workshop on pharmaceutical stockpiles which was chaired by Mr. Steve Bice, Director of the U.S. Pharmaceutical Stockpile Program at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, Georgia. The Co-chair for the session was Dr. Slavko Antolic, Belupo Pharmaceuticals of Croatia. Mr. Bice provided an overview of the U.S. pharmaceutical stockpile program that includes drugs, antidotes and equipment.
It was emphasized throughout the session that knowing what to buy and actually buying it is actually the easy part of the process. What is much more difficult and equally important is to see that the supplies are delivered to the right location in the right configuration at the right time. Additionally, there are many details that are required to maintain the stockpiles including the proper rotation of stocks, QA and QC inspections and database management. Counties that are considering establishing a national stockpile of medications and equipment for WMD preparedness should consider the many important details and establish a strong management system before the first supplies are procured.
Session 2: Industrial Chemical Terrorism Workshop. This was a three-hour pre-conference workshop on industrial chemical terrorism. The session chair was Mr. Joe Hughart of the Agency for Toxic substances and Disease Registry at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, Georgia. The session Co-chair was Captain Boris Ilijaš of Croatia.
The workshop covered recent incidents of industrial chemical terrorism, assessment factors, appropriate forms of assistance, and sources of information on industrial chemicals. Groups of chemicals most frequently involved in recent incidents include hydrocarbons; industrial chemicals used to fabricate explosives; corrosive gases, liquids, and mists; and poisonous industrial chemicals such as arsenic, cyanide, heavy metals, and phosgene.
State of the art survey methods were presented by the 4th Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team of the Georgia (USA) National Guard. The U.S. Agency also discussed U.S. foreign disaster assistance for chemical and biological terrorism for International Development Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.
Session 3: The third preference workshop on equipment and procedures was held on Sunday afternoon. The session Chair was Dr. Thomas H. Snitch and the Co-chair was Major Ivan Jukic. Four presentations were delivered and the paper session was followed by an hour of hands on demonstrations with the equipment.
Gary Eifried of the EAI Corporation and Peter Stopa of the US Army's Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center at Aberdeen Proving Grounds discussed the recent progress made in developing a screen for identifying the presence of biological material in a suspected sample. They demonstrated the use of a variety of sampling and processing tests that are used to prepare a sample of material for processing. The samples are analyzed to determine the presence of DNA, ATP and proteins. A positive result in their testing procedures identifies the presence of biological materials. Thomas Sizemore of Global Technology Applications demonstrated the 'Visual Purple' project. This is an interactive, computer-based program that is currently being used for training the next generation of crisis managers. The format is to employ an interactive game in which the participants are faced with making a series of choices in a crisis situation. This involves multiple feedbacks assessments and allows the player to work on decision-making skills.
Thor Thompson of RMP and Paul Kahl from the Battelle Memorial Institute demonstrated the configuration of the RMP meteorological tower. They discussed the recent work in developing a package, for installation on the tower that would identify CW, BW, and RW agents. The package would be remotely deployed, with the tower, and feed information on local conditions back to a command center in a safe location. The information is then used to create a graphic of the actual plume in real time and assist in tracking the toxic plume.
Vaso Taleski of the Military Health Institute Center in Skopje, Macedonia explained the further refinements and use of alight cycler called RAPID developed by Idaho Technologies for the U.S. Air Force for the identification of specific biological agents. He showed how the portable system, known as 'Suzanne', could be used in the event of an actual toxic release.
Sector A: General Overview to Chemical and Biological Terrorism by Dr. Keith Vesely
This World Congress on Chemical and Biological Terrorism, the CBMTS-Industry II, held in Dubrovnik, Croatia was exceptional in that it brought together over 200 professionals from 43 countries to discuss the primary issues that confront the international community in this most critical area. Included in the meeting's six sectors were 20 sessions. One sector, devoted to the Pre-Congress Workshop on 21/22 April, was discussed in ASA Newsletter 01-3, and a sector was devoted to the Congress Exercise, which was carried out with utmost precision by several Croatian government organizations with a direct interest in preparations for CB Terrorism. The first Symposium sector, Sector A, was Chaired by Dr. Keith Vesely (US) and Co-Chaired by Dr. Cornelis Erasmus (South Africa). Other Sectors will be covered in future ASA issues. In the first session, which was chaired by Dr. Bernhard Brunner (Switzerland) and Co-Chaired by Dr. Robert DeBell (US), Dr. Brian Davey (OPCW) provided us a baseline of data from which to start these proceedings. Dr. Davey gave a brief history of the CBMTS and reviewed the six preceding meetings. He outlined the changes in direction the CBMTS has taken over the years to stay well forward of current thinking across the arena of CBW defense. The CBMTS is noted for its special emphasis on all aspects of the CB medical problem as well as terrorism and its impact on the military and civil infrastructure and industry. He gave the current status of the CWC and OPCW to include an update on the number of signatories and ratifies as well as a review of existing CW agent and munitions stockpiles.
What are the industrial chemicals most attractive to terrorists? Cmdr. Joseph Hughart of the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, said the chemicals would be corrosive, ignitable, toxic or chemically reactive, and include hydrocarbons, explosive chemicals, ammonia and chlorine as corrosive gases, and pesticides as toxic organic chemicals. He said those chemicals most involved in accidents are also the ones most likely to be used by terrorists.
Jack McGeorge, US, said that in an analysis of non-military incidents involving chem or bio agents, motives for use ranged from philosophical to religious to extortion, and no sophisticated engineering skills were required or employed for dissemination. More than 50% of the bio incidents were only threats and did not involve any agents.
Bernard Anet of the AC-Laboratorium Spiez, Switzerland provided a first for the CBMTS series and that was a very important look at nuclear and radiological terrorism. The spread of radiological materials is most likely as a terrorist weapon, while stolen fissible material is unlikely.
Thor Thomsen and Tom Snitch (US) then presented a video, which described a computer model to predict the movement and impact of a major chemical explosion.
In the second session which was Chaired by Dr. Elena Ryabchikova (Russia) and Co-Chaired by Dr. Gui Santana (Brazil), Florin Paul (Romania) of the Army Center for Medical Research in Bucharest reported on the treatment approaches in the event of a biological crisis. He addressed the signs of natural events and the criminal application of infectious agents and, the problems on epidemiological and ethical aspects of the response to biological weapons were summarized.
Thor Thomsen (US) talked on the use of the Risk Management Planning modeling system to model terrorist actions and industrial accidents. The importance of using meteorological, demographic, and geographic information to accurately assess a chemical disaster was discussed.
The paper presented by Zvonko Orehovec (Croatia) provided good evidence that the CWC is not a memorial paper, but is a working document, which causes questions and discussions. Dr. Orehovec pointed out the need for clear designation of all aspects of the international assistance in the case of chemical attack. Per-Ake Kristensson (Sweden) presented information about the Swedish Rescue Service Agency, which is responsible for the coordination of all rescue activities. He displayed the assignments, assumptions, organization, personnel and tasks, preparedness, equipment, safety, transport, training, exercise and planning. The report provided a comprehensive vision of Swedish chemical support team.
The last reporter of the session, Michelle Jennings (US), presented a scheme of the response of US Agency for International Development to disasters in other countries. Her report was devoted to the program developed by the Agency, which is destined to provide a broad range of support, including funding, supplies, equipment and technical services. She gave examples of the work of this program implemented in several countries.
In the third session which was Chaired by Mr. Thomas Sizemore (US) and Co-Chaired by Prof. Gurayten Ozyurt (Turkey), Corneel Bellanger's paper, CB Terrorism Defense in Belgium: How and Why?, discussed key points heard many times in this Congress.
Countries have to assess the main terrorist threat for their own situation. Belgium has many international companies and organizations (i.e. NATO) and sees them as the most likely targets. Belgium took the option to use one single disaster plan and to prepare its first responders to exceptional situations like terrorist attacks. The final key issue identified is the difference in risk perception between the expert in the field and the political leaders. Technical experts tend to focus on a certain kind of crisis, independent of time, while politicians focus on a larger spectrum but a shorter time frame.
Much more narrow in scope, both Mika Otakar (Czech Republic), The New Integrated System in the Czech Republic, and Laszlo Kozari (Hungary), System of Hungarian System Management, emphasized the recently enacted laws within their respective countries. The two countries have independently created a unified code for better response to the possible threat from chemical and biological terrorism.
The paper, Chemical and Biological Terrorism: A Brazilian Perspective, presented by Gui Santana (Brazil) outlined the unique terrorist problems faced by Brazil. The biggest problem has been the move of more drug dealers from Columbia into the Amazon (cont. pg 14 - CBMTS Ind II) (CBMTS Ind II - from pg 12) basin. This has brought a rise of violence as the various groups compete for the illegal trade. One group recently used poison as a means to attack another group. Even though there has been no terrorist activity directed at Brazil, they are aware of terrorist groups who want to use Brazil to aid in drug and arms smuggling and laundry money.
Gianfranco Tracci's (Italy) paper, A New Threat Chemical and Biological Terrorism, An Italian Perspective, provided a historical view of terrorism in Italian history since the Roman times. The conclusion was that international organizations are the key vehicle to combating the possible new type of terrorism.
Two papers, Meeting the Chemical Biological and Radiological (CBR) Threat: Sydney Olympic Games - 2000, and The New Global Standard: WMD Community Preparedness, from Australia and the United States respectfully, showed the large amount of funds being spent on chemical and biological terrorism. Warwick Penrose (Australia) described their two-year effort to get ready for the Olympics. Preparation required the best equipment and training available. Later in the session, Richard Vigus (US) described the program developed by the U.S. Army to assist local officials to prepare to protect the civilian population from the consequences of a possible terrorist use of chemical or biological agent. The Military Improved Response Program was developed with input from local leaders and technical experts.
Dario Matika's (Croatia) paper, Undersea Detection of Chemical Weapons and Mines, expressed the Croatian concern that munitions dumped in the sea since World War II may pose a threat to shipping and commercial fishing. The paper described a possible method to find, localize, and destroy such underwater hazards. However, the only known dumps are not in Croatian territorial waters. The fourth and final session in this sector was Chaired by Dr. Corneel Bellanger (Belgium) and Co-Chaired by Mr. Jack McGeorge (US). Evelyn LeChene's (UK) presentation examined the terrorist threat. In analyzing the threat, the goalpost has changed from military targets to civilian populations. This is facilitated by improved communications, enhanced access to data and the ease of cross border travel. "New Terrorism" targets include industry, food chains., and individual groups that are targeted on the basis of political, religious or ethnic considerations. The weaponization and delivery of CB agents involves a fundamental and sequential relationship between the agent, its dissemination, and its delivery as a CB weapon was presented by Jack Mc George (US). From an analysis of 233 non-military incidents of the actual or apparent intended use of chemical or biological agents, a typology of weaponization and delivery means was developed. This analysis indicates a significant difference between terrorist and conventional military thinking regarding agent dissemination and delivery to intended targets. Joseph Hughart (US) proposed the assessment of the threat from industrial chemicals as WMD can be conducted using a simple model. The model is constructed by arranging a number of critical factors in such a way that their first letters spell the word ASSESSMENT. i.e. Amount of chemicals, Sources of WMD, Signs of incidents, Environmental contamination/delivery, Syndromes, Sensitive populations, Morbidity/mortality, Equipment available, Needs, and Training. Industrial chemicals can be arranged in descending order of frequency and hazard as follows, viz: flammable liquids (gasoline), > industrial gases (ammonia and chlorine) > solid and liquid pesticides > radiation chemicals.
Douglas Eaton (Canada) presented an overview of the current NBC mitigation technologies and equipment from Irvin Aerospace in Canada, which was also demonstrated during a field exercise. Colin Harwood (Canada) presented a generic protocol for decisions regarding packages possibly containing a chemical or biological agent. Two scenarios viz. opened or unopened packages need to be considered, and guidelines were given, both for immediate action as well as for CBRN response teams, according to a decision algorithm.
Following complaints of unknown ailments by Canadian soldiers who were stationed in Croatia during 1993 - 1995, Ladislav Palinkas (Croatia) presented details of an investigation launched by Croatia regarding the possible cause of such ailments. Sandbags used to build shelters for these soldiers during the war were filled with bauxitic material, red mud, terra rosa red soil and brown soil. Analysis of samples by both Croatian and Canadian expert teams were inconclusive as to the cause of the ailments.
CBMTS-Industry II Summaries of Sector B: "Problem Definition"
Sector Chair: Prof. Sergey Netesov, Russia
Sector Co-chair: Mr. Richard Vigus, USA
"The seventh meeting in the Chemical and Biological Medical Treatment Symposia (CBMTS) series, which was held in Dubrovnik, Croatia from 21 through 27 April 2001, attracted over 200 of the world's most noted professionals in science and medicine from 43 countries. Considering the tragic events which have unfolded within the past several weeks, this Congress "The first World Congress on Chemical and Biological Terrorism" was very prophetic in the issues surfaced and solutions recommended within the broad range of approximately 100 papers presented in Dubrovnik. The below Sector Summary with all of its Session Summaries was compiled and edited by Professor, Dr. Sergey Netesov, Deputy Director Vector in Novosibirsk.
Session B1: Chemical Sources and Prevention Chair: Dr. Vera Simeon-Rudolf, Croatia and Co-Chair: Dr. Otakar Mika, Czech Republic
Jiri Matousek, Czech Republic, (Possibilities of Detection and Early Warning in Case of Terrorist Chemical Attacks in Subways) presented a lecture on the detection system in the underground in Prague. He informed the Congress that responsible authorities of the city of Prague decided to equip the Prague underground with a detection system for toxic gases using the ion mobility spectrometer RAID-I. Underground transportation systems and station tunnels, crowded with people within relatively narrow and closed spaces, are vulnerable to attack with toxic chemicals. Mario Morales, US, (Development and Implementation of Civil Support Teams for Weapons of Mass Destruction) presented in his contribution, the need of a special service for the first order responders such as police, local firefighters and emergency medical services. He provided information on the Civil Support Teams for weapons of mass destruction and their support to first order responders.
Constantin Mircioiu, Romania, (Sources of Chemical Toxics and their Precursors in the Pharmaceutical Industry) presented some examples of the pharmaceutical industry and drug laboratories as possible targets or sources of terrorist attacks. Franjo Plavsic, Croatia, (Liquefied toxic and corrosive gases in heavily populated areas) described the possible problems of liquefied toxic and corrosive gases such as chlorine, when used as a water disinfectant and ammonia in refrigerating plants located close to or in populated areas, which include possible accidents due to damage, gas leakage or terrorist attack.
Galina Makhaeva, Russia, presented a highly sensitive biosensor for the analysis of neuropathic target esterase in human and hen blood (Blood Neuropathy Target Esterase as Biochemical Markers for Neuropathic Organophosphate Exposure) and in addition the author described in vitro and in vivo studies of a series of organophosphorus compounds concerning their effect on target enzymes acetylcholinesterase and neuropathy target esterase (O-alkyl-O-methylchloroformiminophenyl phosphonates delayed neurotoxicity risk assessment). Some organophosphorus compounds, due to their acute cholinergic toxicity and in addition possible organophosphate-induced delayed neurotoxicity, might be of interest for terrorist groups.
Session B2: Biological Sources and Prevention Chair: Prof. Christophor Dishovsky, Bulgaria and Co-Chair: Dr. Joe Brumfield, USA
Problems of emerging and re-emerging infections are closely related to possible bioterrorism actions because the former could mask the latter. Due to the increase of national fanaticism and national conflicts in multinational states, the probability of bioterrorism actions is increasing and therefore civilized countries should be prepared to suppress these actions by having a special emergency management system, emergency stocks of fast and sensitive diagnostic kits, emergency prophylactic and treatment means and a decontamination team with appropriate equipment and disinfection means. One of the key things, which should be pre-determined, is the list of possible bioterrorism agents, which, obviously, does not coincide with the list of possible BW agents. Two reports of this session, given by Prof. Lotfali Haghighi, Iran, (Emerging Infections and Bioterrorism) and by Dr. Slavo Bokan, Croatia, (Evaluation of Nipah Virus as a Human and Animal Biological Terrorism and Warfare Agent) were devoted to this problem. A case was presented for the inclusion of Nipah virus as an animal biological agent. The effectiveness of this virus was detailed. Several outbreaks of the virus have resulted in human deaths. It remains uncertain how the virus is transmitted although direct contact appears most likely. Instances of the virus transmission from contact with swine sick from >barking pig> disease has been identified. Researchers believe that fox/fruit bats may be the original reservoir of Nipah virus. The virus is not included in the list of animal biological agents because it did not fulfill all the criteria of a bioweapon; it has not been identified as having been weaponized. Dr. Bokan suggested that the Nipah paramyxovirus should be added to this list. It also became clear that many factors should be taken into account for determination of this list, and special experiments should be done in some cases to clarify the suitability of infectious agents for this purpose. Prof. Lotfali Haghighi drew attention to several infectious materials that may have future use as bioterrorism weapons. It was detailed that several outbreaks of infection had the potential to be bioterrorism (Sector B - from p. 7) acts. The case was presented that these events, had they been a deliberate act of terrorism, could not have been identified as such since the infectious material would not have been suspect. Materials that have not been used as biological agents (Chlamydia pneumonia, Legionella multophilla, etc.) could find their way into terrorist hands and be used as bioterrorist agents. Older materials should also be considered.
Dr. Mirko Hadzija (Managing Chemical and Biological Agents) reported that some unusual substance - similar to a cobweb - had been found in Croatia during the ´90s war. He discussed some characteristics of this material and explored the possibility of its use for carrying infectious agents for bioterrorism or BW purposes. The biological effects of this material (eye/cell damage) were detailed. The discussion that followed showed that the methodology of identification of the microorganisms in some countries should be improved. The chemical analysis and final evaluation was the topic of a paper in Session C.2.
A new paper on the Ebola virus was substituted for the paper on Orthopoxvirus. Dr. Elena Ryabchikova, Russia, (The Ebola Virus Replication in Macrophages and its Relation to the Virus Pathogenicity) reported the data from the experimental investigation of pathogenesis of Ebola virus infection to determine the correct choice of an animal model suitable for potential drug evaluation. Studies of the Ebola virus biological properties are very important for the development of antiviral treatment and prophylaxis. Initial (wild) population of Ebola virus is not homogeneous. It contains virus particles having different biological and genetic properties. This study showed that the virus particles have different pathogenic potential for guinea pigs and may be different for other animals. The interaction of the virus with macrophages plays a critical role for the disease development and outcome. This study showed the importance of host systems for development of abilities of Ebola virus to kill the host. Simple procedures of transmission of Ebola from one animal to another may result in unpredictable changes of the virus properties. Viruses are poorly understood pathogens. This is a reason for paying particular attention to these pathogens and for the development of treatment and prophylaxis.
A position was established for consideration of VECTOR (State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology at Koltsovo, Russia) as an international center for responding to bioterrorism in Asia. Details on the facility available at VECTOR as well as the current and future projects were presented by Dr. Sergey Netesov, Russia, (The Need for Creation of the International Center in Novosibirsk, Russia for Combatting Infectious Diseases and Bioterrorism Threat in Asia). This center could be both a research and educational institution for emergency team specialists. The need for the center also is justified by the unique opportunities which Vector already has as the WHO Collaborating Center for Orthopoxvirus Research, as a long-term acting BSL-4 lab and being located near the geographical center of Former Soviet Union (FSU) and Asia. It was interesting to note that international research on several aspects of smallpox virus (genome sequence and search for antiviral drugs) is planned at a cost of over $4.5M (US). The proposed Center could also conduct experimental research to investigate unusual outbreaks for their possible artificial nature by molecular epidemiology methods. Details on the facility available at VECTOR as well as the current and future projects were discussed.
After the presentations there was also a small discussion about the World Health Assembly (WHA) recommendation to destroy in December 2002, the remaining smallpox virus strains being preserved now at CDC in the US and at Vector in Russia. A concern was voiced from the floor during the Q&A session about the wisdom of maintaining the smallpox virus since it may pose a target for bioterrorists. It was mentioned that the physical security of these labs should be upgraded to the best possible level, and, at the same time, the strains should not be destroyed until modern diagnostics, prophylactic and treatment means are developed based on the comprehensive knowledge of the strains sequences which is still in the initial stage.
Session B3: Dissemination, Detection of Biological Agents and Management Chair: Dr. Colin Harwood, Canada Co-Chair: Prof. Lotfali Haghighi, Iran
Dr. Robert DeBell, US, (Particle Size and Organism Number: Impact on Bio-aerosols) presented a new approach to the evaluation of aerosol infectious dose of microorganisms. The effects of particle size on retention within the respiratory system and its relationships between infectivity and particle size are important concepts with respect to bio-aerosols. Exposure to a bio-aerosol is usually dependent on arbitrary units of mass alone that does not define particle size and, subsequently, distribution in the respiratory system. It was shown that aerosol particles containing much smaller amount of infectious agents than it had been suggested earlier might cause the disease. Models used to develop technologies to protect from a BW event should use microbial infectivity with an understanding of the real particle size and infectivity. These considerations should be valuable to produce samplers and detection and protection devices needed to predict and limit the effects of a BW attack.
Dr. Vaso Taleski, Macedonia, (Rapid - PCR (Light Cycler) in Diagnosis of Biological Agents) made a presentation of the new portable device for PCR-analysis of biosamples. The R.A.P.I.D. - PCR (Ruggedized Advanced Pathogen Identification Device) is a 32 sample capacity, automated instrument integrating Idaho Technology's Light Cycler technology into a portable, impact resistant package. Protocols for isolation of bacterial and viral DNA or RNA have been developed for clinical specimens, air samples and water samples. Protocols for food samples are being developed now. Assays are in use for: B anthracis, Y. pestis, Clostridium botulinum, Staphylococcus, F. tularensis, Salmonella, Shigella, V. cholerae, E. coli, Campylobacter, Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEE) virus, West Nile encephalitis virus, Yellow fever virus, Brucella spp. and many others. This device is quite portable, simple in use and is a prospective candidate for field investigations of biosamples for the presence of different DNA- and RNA-containing biological agents.
Dr. Gary Eifried, US, (Psychological Effects of CB Terrorism: Lessons from the Past) reported about the real experience of psychological stress effect on different population groups after a terrorist attack. The psychological implications of a terrorist attack using CB weapons were discussed. The methodology used was a review of the literature and published interviews with those affected, especially those involved in the Tokyo subway and the Oklahoma terrorist attacks. Mr. Eifried described the symptoms of Acute Stress Disorder (ASD) and Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and discussed the results of further follow-up of these affected populations. The psychological stress is described as a very important complication among the victims, population and emergency response teams after terrorist action. Mr. Eifried is a retired US Army Chemical Officer who has been involved in providing terrorism response training to emergency responders in more than 105 cities in the US and internationally.
Dr. Rassie Erasmus, South Africa, (South African Military Health Service Involvement during an Outbreak of Cholera in Kwazulu - Natal) made a presentation describing the management of a recent cholera outbreak in South Africa. Insight is provided into the first SA experience of large-scale cooperation between public and military health services during the current cholera epidemic in the KwaZulu- Natal province of South Africa. Unfavorable socio-economic and environmental features of affected areas and the influence thereof on planning and execution of support and response operations are highlighted, with emphasis on the establishment of oral rehydration centers, treatment regimes and adverse working conditions. Lessons learned from a Military Health Service perspective may have significance for international initiatives such as the CBMTS regarding preparedness and response towards the possible effects of biological agents on civilian populations, particularly in remote and underdeveloped areas. This experience is especially valuable because it describes the real events and real measures taken for response to the outbreak of enterically transmitted infectious disease in a rural remote district with poor infrastructure. It is emphasized that failure by international authorities to install timely precautionary measures against the spread of disease across international borders through increasing globalization may result in global catastrophe.
Dr. Peter Stopa, US, (Strategies for the Detection of Unknown Biological Materials) reported about the strategy development for detection of biological hazards. The potential use of biological materials as weapons of terror dictates that rapid methods are needed to screen for the presence of these materials in environmental samples. There are a variety of signatures that could be present in weaponized materials that could be used. These include particle size and shape or the determination of whether the material is either biological or toxin in nature. Additives or encapsulant materials could also be used for screening. Once such a material has been used, it may be useful to provide rapid medical intervention. These signatures could be exploited to provide protection to high value, fixed site assets, or can be used by first responders.
The presentation with title Biohaz: a Concept for First Responders: (Rapid on-site Biological Detection) was been given by Dr. Peter Stopa for Randall Bright of EAI in the US. The increase in hoax events by terrorists shows that a means is needed to rapidly screen for the presence of biological materials in suspect samples. The BioHaz system provides a means for first responders to sample and detect biological materials on surfaces or in liquids, envelopes, etc. The system uses conventional laboratory tests for DNA, protein and adenosine triphosphate (ATP), as components of live microorganisms. These three approaches are compared and discussed. The results of these tests could then be further analysed either on site or in the laboratory with confirmatory techniques. This system thus provides the first responder with a simple, cost effective means to minimize responses to events that may be hoaxes.
It would be useful in the future to organize round-table discussions about the most controversial and actual problems: a real and timely example during the meeting would be to organize the discussions about the need of smallpox strains destruction and the list of possible bioterrorism agents.
SECTOR: CONGRESS EXERCISE AND RELATED EXHIBITIONS
CHAIR: Lt. Col. ZVONKO OREHOVEC (CROATIA)
CO-CHAIR: Mr. DOUGLAS EATON (CANADA)
ORGANIZERS OF THE CONGRESS EXERCISE
- MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
- MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
- NBC Team Limited Canada
Session 1: Congress Exercise
CHAIR: Major TOMICA SABOLIĆ (CROATIA)
CO-CHAIR: Captain WARWICK PENROSE (AUSTRALIA)
INTRODUCTION
Somewheria and Anywheria are neighboring countries in transition with border disputes. Both countries are not State Parties of OPCW. Somewheria has a warehouse with old chemical weapons in the mountains 70km from the border with Anywheria. In the wider area of the warehouse complex, rapid settlement began because of the development of new production technology of electronic equipment. Anywheria decided to execute a terrorist attack on the warehouse and cause panic and suffering with the population in order to stop further settlement in that area and slow down the economic development of the neighboring country.
A DESCRIPTION OF THE TERRORIST ACT
A terrorist group executed an attack on a warehouse complex containing old chemical weapons. The attack was executed using armor-piercing system RPG-7.
Following the attack the special antiterrorist unit from Ministry of Interior entered the area and neutralized the terrorist units. After the attack, a line of secondary explosions occurred, as rocket projectiles, which dispersed to the distance of few kilometers from the place of attack and cause the contamination of a wider area. Next, alert and evacuation of civilian population followed, as well as the organization for a rapid response and medical help.
Neutralization of the released toxic substances and decontamination of the attacked space (decontamination system by NBC Team Limited Canada) were conducted. Neutralization of the primary source of contamination was performed by decontamination platoon with special equipment for fire extinguishing and decontamination (CASCAD System). CASCAD, an aqueous foam, was designed to contain and eliminate chemical and biological warfare agents, and for removing radioactive particle contamination. Decontamination platoon used special protective equipment and system for protection of the respiratory tract (Dräger, Germany).
Effective detection of a presence of toxic agents in the area around the warehouse before and during this action was performed using very sophisticated and effective detection equipment purchased by Tradeways Ltd. (Annapolis, Maryland, USA)A DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT
In the southern part of Somewheria, a warehouse complex containing old chemical weapons was situated.
The complex, inside of which those weapons were stored, was secured by classic and sophisticated technical security (fence, cameras, sensors, automatic chemical detectors and monitors, meteorological system). Aside from that, the warehouse was located under patrolled surveillance by the atomic-biologic-chemical defense unit, which is responsible for its security.
There was a barrack around 70 km from the area where the warehouse was located, containing the atomic-biologic-chemical defense unit. In case of an accident in the warehouse, considering the distance and readiness factor, the unit could intervene within 2 hours after receiving the alert signal.
The unit had an operational headquarters through which it received information in real time from all devices and instruments founded in the technical security system of the warehouse.
Terrorist groups from Anywheria attacked the warehouse wanting to cause a chemical accident. The attack was carried out using hand held rocket launchers. The attack caused serious damage to the warehouse, which resulted in explosions of chemical projectiles and released of chemical agents (chemical warfare agents) contained in stored old chemical weapons.
Explosions caused by direct hits create secondary explosions of chemical projectiles, which spread to all three buildings in a warehouse complex.
Secondary explosions caused a fire, by ignition of a transport vehicle parked in the area of the warehouse.
The atomic-biologic-chemical defense unit received a “chemical alert” signal, 3 minutes after releasing of the chemical agent (“response time” of the automatic chemical detector).
Decontamination platoon (with the NBC reconnaissance and surveillance equipment), trained and equipped for accidents of this kind was directed to the area of the warehouse complex with a task of chemical decontamination of the accident area.
Upon entering the area of contamination, the platoon located visible damage on the warehouse complex, the release of the chemical agent and forming of a smaller cloud of chemical contamination, as well as a smaller fire on the transport vehicle near one of the warehouses.
The unit split into three groups and begins with the operation.
NBC reconnaissance group approached the warehouse in a vehicle, and determined places of most damage to the warehouses, or the strongest “emission” of chemical agents.
After determining the locations of damage and “emissions” of chemical agents, four decontamination platoons approached the warehouse complex with mobile cisterns for decontamination.
Water supply crew (with 2 mobile water cisterns) and the support crew remained on the border of the outer area of contamination.
Decontamination platoons approached the warehouse and split up for operation. They began extinguishing the fire on the transport vehicle. Next, the decontamination began on the building that has been most severely damaged, with the strongest chemical agent “emission”.
The other two warehouse buildings experienced short-term intensification of the release of chemical agents, during the operation of the water for decontamination.
Decontamination of the remaining two warehouse buildings began.
After the completion of decontamination of buildings, the decontamination platoons moved on to decontamination of surrounding area.
Decontamination platoons finished the operation and exited the inner area of the warehouse complex.
After their departure, the NBC reconnaissance unit performed the control of the decontamination on the warehouse buildings and the inner area of the warehouse complex.
Upon the completion of decontamination control the NBC reconnaissance unit exited the inner area of the warehouse complex.
Primary and secondary explosions started fires in the surrounding area, but because of the inaccessible terrain airplanes and helicopters were not used. Instead, special fire units were used, equipped with special equipment for fire extinguishing and protection. They secure the approached of special NBC units whose members continued to work on fires and prevention of further emission of toxic substances that expands in form of a toxic cloud.
Next, an action of combined units for medical care and civilian protection followed, which have provided rapid response and took care of hurt and poisoned members of special fire and NBC units in the area of primary release of toxic agents.
SESSION 2: EXHIBITION OF IMPORTANT EQUIPMENT AND PROCEDURES
CHAIR: Mr. PER AKE KRISTENSSON (SWEDEN)
CO-CHAIR: Mr. NEIL PITTS (CANADA)
NBC TEAM LIMITED CANADA (EXHIBITION OF EQUIPMENT)
Explosive devices filled with chemical and biological agents was neutralized and decontaminated using the equipment by Canadian company NBC Team Ltd. These devices may be found as objects of terrorist acts or they may be results of terrorist attacks on warehouses that store chemical and biological warfare agents.
As a result of primary explosions, it is possible to come to the activation of rocket fuel which causes uncontrollable flying out of projectiles that drop at a distance of few kilometers from the primary source. That is an additional secondary source of contamination with chemical and biological agents that makes rapid response more difficult. If it does not come to activation of projectiles because of the rearming of detonators and fuses such projectiles are sensitive to self-activation and therefore need to be destroyed on the spot. BLAST GUARD equipment, which makes possible the destruction of such projectiles, is manufactured by NBC Team Limited Canada. BLAST GUARD offers unique capabilities and provides a cost effective means of increasing the safety of both EOD personnel and general public. When dealing with chemical or biological devices, Irvin ICD/IBD kit is the only one that can be placed over the suspect device and will mitigate any chemical or biological agent present.
NBC Team Limited Canada
NBC Team Ltd. Canada is the exclusive supplier of a world leading line of Foam technology based products including the CASCAD Decontamination System, capable of neutralizing and removing Chemical, Biological and Radiological Contamination from vehicles, ships or aircraft, using fresh, gray or salt water. CASCAD can also be used to fight fires. Other such products include the BLAST GUARD System for mitigation of Chemical or Biological terrorist weapons, and the suppression of conventional munitions and explosive devices in excess of 1kg of plastic, while capturing shrapnel. NBC protective products from Irvin Canada also include NBC protective clothing, ballistic protection, gas masks and casualty bags. Irvin supplies these systems, and the requisite training and documentation, to the Military, Police and First Responder Agencies worldwide.
NBC Team Limited Canada
479 Central Avenue
Fort Erie, Ontario
Canada
“There is No Second Place in the First Line of Defense”